The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ethics — Part 5, by Benedictus de Spinoza

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Benedict de Spinoza,best talking learning toys for 5 year olds under 30 dollars THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

PART V: Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACEAt length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concernedwith the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of thepower of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions,and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then beable to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby theunderstanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body maybe so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. Thelatter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the provinceof Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of themind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of itsdominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we donot possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet theStoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, andthat we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled,by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them:and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I rememberrightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. Forby long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should becomeaccustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that thesoul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely,to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind isenabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and alsoexternal objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put inmotion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in themidst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of theanimal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of thebrain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impingethereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the saidgland, as there are different external objects which impel the animalspirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspendsthe gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once beforeby the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turnreacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the conditionwherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in natureto a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyonedesires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil ofthe eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought ofthe dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not havebrought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which servesto impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which woulddilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish todilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or verynear objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of theaforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particularthought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning ofour life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated withother thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame, I. 50.He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, underproper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions asdefined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul,which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of thespirits." (Passion del l'ame,I.27.) But, seeing that we can join any motionof the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, thedetermination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore,we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to whichwe wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions whichwe wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolutedominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustriousphilosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is onewhich, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceededfrom so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, whohad stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not followfrom self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did notclearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task thescholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities,could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace.What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? Whatclear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate unionwith a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him toexplain this union through its proximate cause. What clear and distinctconception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certainparticle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he gotof thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extendedmatter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct frombody, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between thetwo, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause ofthe whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know,what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and withwhat force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether thisgland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by theanimal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we haveclosely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom byphysical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mindfirmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision themotions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might becomesuspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anythingexcept running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volitionand motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of themind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of onecannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may alsoadd, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, soplaced that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and alsothat all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain.Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and itsfreedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false.Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined bythe understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of themind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have hadexperience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from thesame basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to themind's blessedness.

AXIOMS.I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change mustnecessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continueuntil they cease to be contrary.

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so faras its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause. (Thisaxiom is evident from III.vii.)

PROPOSITIONS.

Prop.I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arrangedand associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body orthe images of things precisely in the same way arranged andassociated in the body.

Proof.- The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as the orderand connection of things, and vice versa the order and connection of thingsis the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and connection ofideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mindtakes place according to the order and association of modifications of thebody (II:xviii.), so vice versa (III:ii.) the order and connection ofmodifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, inwhich thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in themind. Q.E.D.

PROP.II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to otherthoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause,and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from theseemotions, be destroyed.

Proof.- That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasureor pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of theEmotions:vi.,&vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality oflove or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and thosewhich arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.

Prop.III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be apassion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

Proof.- An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the generalDef. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of agiven emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in sofar as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II:xxi.,&Note); therefore(III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and themind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known tous.

Prop.IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof wecannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.- Properties which are common to all things can only be conceivedadequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii.and Lemma. ii. after II:xiii.)there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear anddistinct conception. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannotform some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of amodification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and musttherefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinctconception.

Note.- Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect(I:xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whateverfollows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it follows thateveryone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself andhis emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently ofbringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attainthis result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, asfar as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in orderthat the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of thosethings which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fullyacquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from thethought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts;whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will bedestroyed (V:ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont toarise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.).For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man issaid to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is oneand the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is soconstituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his ownfashion (III:xxxi.Note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, thisappetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differfrom pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is anactivity or virtue which is called piety (IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and secondproof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so faras they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited tovirtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For alldesires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as muchfrom adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.). Than this remedy for theemotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in atrue knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, canbe devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and offorming, adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III:iii.).

Prop.V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceivesimply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is,other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.

Proof.- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greaterthan one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:xlix.), and,consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible,or contingent (IV:xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing elsethan to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes wherebyit has been determined to action (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotiontowards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal,greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, orcontingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.

Prop.VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and isless subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things asnecessary.

Proof.- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.) and to bedetermined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes;therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, thatit is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III:xlviii.)feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

Note.- The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied toparticular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, thegreater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience alsotestifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good ismitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could notby any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities aninfant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because itpasses so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if mostpeople were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant,everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked onas a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature;and we may note several other instances of the same sort.

Prop.VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, ifwe take account of time, are stronger than those, which areattributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Proof.- We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotionwherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected byanother emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:xvii.).Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard asabsent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities andpower (IV:vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sortcontrolled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its externalcause (IV:ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarilyreferred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason inII:xl.Note.ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothingto exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in thesame manner (II:xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remainsthe same; and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary theretoand are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adaptthemselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; tothis extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

Prop.VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number ofsimultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

Proof.- Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III:vii.):therefore (IV:v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneouscauses whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.

Note.- This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii.

Prop.IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diversecauses which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotionitself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and lessaffected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different andequally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to asingle cause.

Proof-. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mindfrom being able to think (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an emotion,whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things atonce, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which soengrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one,that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III:vii.), consistssolely in thought (II:xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to anemotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regardto an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplationof a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, thisemotion (III:xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, isless powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.

Prop.X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary toour nature, we have the power of arranging and associating themodifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.- The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV:xxx.),which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding(IV:xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contraryto our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things(IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear anddistinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II:xl.Note.ii. andII:xlvii.Note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arrangingand associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectualorder. Q.E.D.

Note.- By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodilymodifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evilemotions. For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling theemotions, when they are arranged and associated according to theintellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best wecan do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of ouremotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practicalprecepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to theparticular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that ourimagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be alwaysready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life(IV:xlvi., & Note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this preceptof reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should oftenthink over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and inwhat manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shallthus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, whichaccordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us(II:xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our trueadvantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and commonfellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is theresult of the right way of life (IV:lii.), and that men, no less thaneverything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I saythe wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross avery small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if theanger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it willnevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, farsooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As isindeed evident from V:vi.,V:vii.,V:viii. We should, in the same way, reflecton courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of lifeshould frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the meanswhereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid andovercome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts andconceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in everyindividual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and III:lix.), in order that we mayalways be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, ifa man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think overits right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means wherebyhe may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, andthe fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks exceptthrough a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do themost ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining thedistinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger wouldfain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out theloudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are thosewho most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but iscommon to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse ofwealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, andshows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but alsoof other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by awoman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and otherstock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he whowould govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedomstrives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and theircauses, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the trueknowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or tocarp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever willdiligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are notdifficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the mostpart, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.

Prop.XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to moreobjects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupiesthe mind more.

Proof.- In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to moreobjects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered,all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously inassociation with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent,or is more often in full vigour, and (V:viii.) occupies the mind more.Q.E.D.

Prop.XII. The mental images of things are more easilyassociated with the images referred to things which we clearlyand distinctly understand, than with others.

Proof.- Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either thecommon properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition ofReason, II:.xl.Note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) moreoften aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we shouldcontemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction withsomething else, and consequently (II:xviii.) that the images of the saidthings should be more often associated with the images of these than withthe images of something else. Q.E.D.

Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportionas it is associated with a greater number of other images.

Proof.- In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number ofother images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can bearoused. Q.E.D.

Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodilymodifications or images of things may be referred to theidea of God.

Proof.- There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not formsome clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it can bring it about,that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv.). Q.E.D.

Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himselfand his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportionas he more understands himself and his emotions.

Proof.- He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotionsfeels pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.)accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions:vi.) such anone loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion ashe more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.

Prop. XVI. This love towards God musthold the chief place in the mind.

Proof.- For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body(V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:v.); therefore (V:xi.), it must holdthe chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.

Prop. XVII. God is without passions,neither is he affected byany emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.- All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true(II:xxxii.), that is (II:Def.iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the generalDef. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass eitherto a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore(by Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion ofpleasure or pain.

Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (bythe foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain,consequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love or hateanyone.

Prop.XVIII. No one can hate God.

Proof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi.,
II:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active
(III:iii.) ; consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the
idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can hate
God. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of allthings, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I makeanswer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to thatextent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain(III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause ofpain, we to that extent feel pleasure.

Prop. XIX. He, who loves God,cannot endeavour that Godshould love him in return.

Proof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V:xvii.Coroll.)that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desireto feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd (III:xxviii.). Therefore, he wholoves God, &c. Q.E.D.

Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by theemotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered,in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to bejoined to God by the same bond of love.

Proof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek forunder the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men(IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.);therefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by theemotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition ofJealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the morefostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoicetherein. Q.E.D.

Note.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directlycontrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we mayconclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all theemotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot bedestroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far asit is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or allthat the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence itappears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:-

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv.Note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of anexternal cause, which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and V:iv.Note).

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred tothings, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what weconceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii.).

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones.Camerer reads affectus - emotions), are fostered, which have regard to thecommon properties of things or to God (V:ix., V:xi.).

V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, onewith another, its own emotions (V:x.Note and V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.).

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be betterunderstood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called byus strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion ofanother, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the sameemotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man onewith another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotionthan by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by acomparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now thepower of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passionis defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, thatthat mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequateideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive statesthan by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whosegreatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may containas many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easilycharacterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas whichtell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritualunhealthiness; and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love forsomething which is subject to many variations, and which we can never becomemasters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless heloves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except inregard to things whereof no one can be really master.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge,and especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii.Note), founded on theactual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does notabsolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V:iii. andV:iv.Note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of themind (V:xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable andeternal (V:xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II:xlv.);neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinarylove; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greaterpart of the mind, and deeply penetrate it. And now I have finished with allthat concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of thisnote, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. Andthis everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended towhat is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of themind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions III:i. and III:iii. Itis now, therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to theduration of the mind, without relation to the body.

Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything,or remember what is past, while the body endures.

Proof.- The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor doesit imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the bodyendures (II:viii.Coroll.); and, consequently (II:xxvi.), it does not imagineany body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus itcannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II:xvii.Note),or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition ofMemory, II:xviii.Note). Q.E.D.

Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,which expresses the essence of this or that human body underthe form of eternity.

Proof.- God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that humanbody, but also of its essence (I:xxv.). This essence, therefore, mustnecessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (I:Ax.iv.), and bethus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I:xvi.); and this conception.must necessarily exist in God (II:iii.). Q.E.D.

Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutelydestroyed with the body, but there remains of itsomething which is eternal.

Proof.- There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses theessence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarilysomething appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II:xiii.). But wehave not assigned to the human mind any, duration, definable by time, exceptin so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which isexplained through duration, and may be defined by time - that is(II:viii.Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the bodyendures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived bya certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.);this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, willnecessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.- This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form ofeternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs tothe essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possiblethat we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body canbear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms oftime, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and knowthat we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives byunderstanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes ofthe mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs.Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet wefeel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, underthe form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot bedefined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind canonly be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixedtime, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus faronly has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, andconceiving them under the category of duration.

Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particularthings, the more do we understand God.

Proof.- This is evident from I:xxv.Coroll.

Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind,and the highest virtue is to understand thingsby the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.- The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea ofcertain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things(see its definition III:xl.Note.ii.); and, in proportion as we understandthings more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.);therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is IV:Def.viii.)the power, or nature, or (III:vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is tounderstand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind ismore capable of understanding things bythe third kind of knowledge, it desiresmore to understand things by that kind.

Proof.- This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to becapable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent,conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. ofthe Emotions:i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is morecapable thereof. Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVII. From this third kind ofknowledge arises the highest possiblemental acquiescence.

Proof.- The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV:xxviii.), or tounderstand things by the third kind of knowledge (V:xxv.), and this virtueis greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind ofknowledge (V:xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind ofknowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore(Def. of the Emotions:ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasurebeing accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. ofthe Emotions:xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possibleacquiescence. Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire toknow things by the third kind of knowledgecannot arise from the first, but from thesecond kind of knowledge.

Proof.- This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understandclearly and distinct we understand either through itself, or through thatwhich is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear anddistinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge(II:xl.Note.ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary, andconfused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must followfrom adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge;therefore (Def. of the Emotions:i.), the desire of knowing things by thethird kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the secondkind. Q.E.D.

Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understandsunder the form of eternity, it does notunderstand by virtue of conceiving thepresent actual existence of the body,but by virtue of conceiving the essence ofthe body under the form of eternity.

Proof.- In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body,it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and tothat extent only, has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time(V:xxi., II:xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration(I:Def.viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not thepower of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses suchpower, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under theform of eternity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.), and also because it is of the natureof the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity(V:xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to theessence of mind (II:xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things underthe form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind'sconceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Note.- Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existingin relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and followingfrom the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in thissecond way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, andtheir ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showedin II:xlv.&Note, which see.

Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the bodyunder the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily aknowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceivedthrough God.

Proof.- Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involvesnecessary existence (I:Def.viii.). Therefore to conceive things under theform of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceivedthrough thp essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involveexistence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as itconceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extentnecessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledgedepends on the mind, as its formal cause,in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.- The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity,except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity(V:xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V:xxi., V:xxiii.);therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses theknowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate(II:xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable ofknowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God(II:xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge(see Def. in II:xl.Note.ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III:Def.i.), inso far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge.Q.E.D.

Note.- In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind ofknowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; inother words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear moreclearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we arealready certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives thingsunder the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may bemore readily explained and better understood, we will consider the minditself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things underthe form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may dowithout any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw anyconclusion, unless our premisses are plain.

Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind ofknowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied bythe idea of God as cause.

Proof.- From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mentalacquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions:xxv.), pleasure, and thisacquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), andconsequently (V:xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises theintellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasureaccompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions:vi.),the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V:xxix.), butin so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call theintellectual love of God.

Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God,which arises from the third kind of knowledge,is eternal.

Proof.- The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V:xxxi., I:Ax.iii.);therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is alsonecessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.- Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) nobeginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though ithad arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there hereany difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those sameperfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied bythe idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition toa greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind beingendowed with perfection itself.

Prop. XXX.IV. The mind is, only while the bodyendures, subject to those emotions which areattributable to passions.

Proof. Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing aspresent (II:xvii.Note); yet this idea indicates rather the presentdisposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing(II:xvi.Coroll.ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions)is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of thebody; therefore (V:xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subjectto emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.

Note.- If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they areindeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuseeternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memorywhich they believe to remain after death.

Prop. XXXV. God loves himself withan infinite intellectual love.

Proof.- God is absolutely infinite (I:Def.vi.), that is (II:Def.vi.), thenature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is(II:iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I:xi. and I:Def.i.),the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V:xxxii.Coroll.)described as intellectual love.

Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God isthat very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far ashe is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained throughthe essence of the human mind regarded under the form ofeternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towardsGod is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Proof.- (1) This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of themind (V:xxxii.Coroll. and III:iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activitywhereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause(V:xxxii.&Coroll.); that is (I:xxv.Coroll. and II:xi.Coroll.), an activitywhereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind,regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the lastProp.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith Godloves himself. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, lovesman, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and theintellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.

Note.- From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation,or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternallove towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is,in the Bible, called Glory and not undeservedly. For whether this love bereferred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence ofspirit, which (Def. of the Emotions:xxv., and xxx.) is not reallydistinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is(V:xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the ideaof itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same(V:xxvii.).

Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereofthe beginning and the foundation is God (I:xv., &II:xlvii.Note), it becomesclear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence andexistence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. Ihave thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to showby this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have calledintuitive or of the third kind (II:xl.Note.ii.), is potent, and morepowerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of thesecond kind. For, although in Part I showed in general terms, that allthings (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essenceand existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placedbeyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when thesame conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing,which we say depends on God.

Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature,which is contrary to this intellectual love,or which can take it away.

Proof.- This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of themind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as aneternal truth (V:xxxiii. and V:xxix.). If, therefore, there should beanything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would becontrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able totake away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obviousabsurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.- The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so faras they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, Ithink, no one can doubt.

Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands morethings by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is lesssubject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in lessfear of death.

Proof.- The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II:xi.); therefore, inproportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kindsof knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V:xxix. andV:xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be thepart that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature,or in other words, evil (IV:xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mindunderstands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, thegreater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently,less subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.- Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV:xxxix.Note,and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomesless hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge isgreater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possibleacquiescence (V:xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain tobeing of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown toperish with the body (V:xxi.) should be of little importance when comparedwith the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greaterlength.

Prop. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capableof the greatest number of activities, possessesa mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.

Proof.- He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number ofactivities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV:xxxviii.)that is (IV:xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature;therefore (V:x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating themodifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and,consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the bodyshould be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that(V:xv.) he will be affected with love towards God, which (V:xvi) must occupyor constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V:xxxiii.), such a manwill possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.- Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities,there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may bereferred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, andwhereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that theyshould scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood moreclearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetualvariation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, weare called happy or unhappy.

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is calledunhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to livethrough the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, inreality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capableof very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on externalcauses, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely consciousof itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable ofvery many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, ishighly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore,we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in sofar as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into somethingelse capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which ishighly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so tochange it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may becomeinsignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said inthe note to the last Proposition.

Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possessesmore of perfection, so is it more active, andless passive; and, vice versa, in proportion asit is more active, so is it more perfect.

Proof.- In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more ofreality (II:Def.vi.), and, consequently (III:iii.and Note), it is to thatextent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, andthus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it moreperfect. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be itgreat or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of themind (V:xiii. and V:xxix.) the understanding, through which alone we aresaid to act (III:iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is theimagination (V:xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III:iii.and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great orsmall, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.

Note.- Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerningthe mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence,as also from I:xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so faras it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined byanother eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on toinfinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal andinfinite intellect of God.

Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know thatour mind is eternal, we should stillconsider as of primary importance pietyand religion, and generally all thingswhich, in Part IV., we showed to beattributable to courage and high-mindedness.

Proof.- The first and only, foundation of virtue, or the rule of rightliving is (IV:xxii.Coroll. and IV:xxiv.) seeking one's own true interest.Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took noaccount of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in thisFifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal,we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high-mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were stillignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts ofreason in the first place. Q.E.D.

Note.- The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Mostpeople seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey theirlusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to liveaccording to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe thatpiety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness ofmind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and toreceive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety, andreligion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear ofbeing horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live accordingto the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit willcarry them.

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perisheswith the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretcheswho are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their owninclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, anddesiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to menot less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can bywholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself withpoisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternalor immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to livewithout the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worthrefuting.

Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtueitself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control ourlusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are ableto control our lusts.

Proof.- Blessedness consists in love towards God (V:xxxvi. and Note), whichlove springs from the third kind of knowledge (V:xxxii.Coroll.); thereforethis love (III:iii. and III:lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far asthe latter is active; therefore (IV:Def.viii.) it is virtue itself.This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more inthis divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V:xxxii.);that is (V:iii.Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions,and (V:xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotionswhich are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divinelove or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, sincehuman power in controlling the emotions consists solely in theunderstanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because hehas controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling hislusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Note.- I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind'spower over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, howpotent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who isdriven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted invarious ways by external causes without ever gaining, the true acquiescenceof his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and ofGod, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely atall disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and ofthings, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but alwayspossesses true acquiescence of his spirit.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seemsexceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard,since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation wereready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it shouldbe by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are asdifficult as they are rare.

End of Part V.

End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part V], by Benedict de Spinoza

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